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This project aims to enhance the capacity of the Air Force (AF) to reduce death, injury, and degraded force readiness via reduction of the prevalence and impact of family maltreatment, suicidality, and alcohol/drug problems. Managing risk and increasing resilience in military human resources (i.e., "Force Health Protection") is a top priority for DoD and Armed Forces leadership. The objective of this study is to enhance the AF's current prevention delivery (known as the Integrated Delivery System; IDS) infrastructure through (a) the development and validation of a information system needed to direct prevention efforts more effectively and efficiently; (b) the adoption of a prevention-science-based approach; and (c) the evaluation of its effectiveness. When funded, the proposed project was broken into two phases. This first phase is a demonstration project on which to build a randomized trial. This project is meeting the objectives by: (a) pilot testing the development of an innovative surveillance system and validating its accuracy (at 3 AF bases) for family maltreatment, suicidality, and problematic alcohol and drug use, and (b) pilot testing the creation of an enhanced IDS by training community leaders in prevention-science-based intervention methodology and testing the impact on factors that are prerequisites for effective community prevention initiatives and on targeted outcomes.
BODY:
Year 2 (Months 13-24) Task 1: Provide technical assistance to IDS teams at pilot bases in implementing action plans systematically monitor impact, and adjust implementations accordingly Task 1 has been completed successfully. Orientation and training materials have been revised. Base leadership assessments are currently being completed at this time and should be completed by the end of March 2005. Bases were revisited in summer 2004 and maintain weekly telephone support with the Stony Brook POC to ensure continued success. These activities are described in detail next.
NORTH STAR Pilot Implementation to Date Pilot at First Thee Bases (Oct-03 -Mar-05) Briefings and First-Step Activities
The first three volunteer bases (Barksdale, Shaw and Tyndall) received their CA+ data and their NORTH STAR on-site training in Oct-Nov 2003. The exact itinerary of each visit was tailored to the individual desires and protocols of the local base, although visits generally consisted of an in-brief to the key leaders and/or the CAIB, 1.5 days of training with the IDS, and an out-brief to the CAIB. The training is encapsulated in the attached product: NORTH STAR Training Manual.
At the end of the initial training all three bases had completed the first several steps of NORTH STAR (i.e., prioritizing target problems and risk/protective factors based on their data and identifying possible activities to implement from the Guidebook) and were in the process of investigating/selecting activities and developing a community action plan. Table 1 provides an overview of these results for these bases as well as Kadena AB, the fourth pilot 
Follow-Up Consultation Visits
In July-04 -August-04 members of the Stony Brook NORTH STAR team made followup consultation visits to the three pilot bases. Each of these visits consisted of two days of training for the IDS Teams and an out-brief to the CAIB. At each base the IDS Team received one-half day training consisting of IDS overview and NORTH STAR review for new IDS members and a one and one-half day training focused on base-specific implementation issues as well as monitoring and evaluation planning. These base consultation visits proved extremely valuable in identifying implementation challenges (gaps, limitations and shortcomings) faced by the IDS service providers. Actions taken to resolve these problems served as important lessons learned in structuring and adjusting the NORTH STAR prevention training for the fourth pilot at Kadena AB.
Progress was limited between Oct-03 -Jul-04. Although the three pilot bases engaged in ongoing research and planning for implementation of the selected activities, only one program, Triple P at Shaw, was implemented. One common theme was the lack of a clearly defined, detailed plan that included milestones and timelines. Responsibilities were not clearly delineated and accountability to CAIB was limited. Each base experienced difficulty in obtaining funding resources.
The primary focus for the 2004 consultation visits was to address the limited progress in implementing activities selected at the initial training eight months earlier. The earlier training provided "implementation considerations" for each of the identified activities, but did not engage the IDS Teams in identifying POCs responsible for each activity; nor in
developing specific tasks and milestones; nor in establishing estimated completion dates. That training assumed, mistakenly, that IDS Teams would establish these systems of structure and accountability to guide the implementation of each activity. As this assumption became evident, modifications were made to the training protocol to increase the detail and specificity of implementation plans and to ensure tasks, milestones and POCs were identified. During the 2004 consultation visits another barrier to implementation became apparent. IDS teams were operating almost in isolation, disconnected from the community. No sponsor, champion or advisor from senior leadership was monitoring the IDS. Team members were earnestly working but without the involvement or connection to other community stakeholders, in particular the CAIB, the community board of directors to whom they ultimately reported: At none of the bases was the CAIB engaged in an active, oversight, guidance role. The IDS demonstrated cross-agency collaboration, but were working in isolation from leadership, command structure and the community. In terms of the Communities That Care (CTC) model, they were engaged in stage 3, "strategic plan development," without capitalizing on the broad-based community coalition that existed. In particular, they were not optimizing their relationship with the community board, the CAIB.
> Summary: Lessons learned from initial 9 months of implementation at initial bases: "* Long latency period between IDS activities; delays in implementing activities "* Inequitable distribution of work/labor "o Often the IDS Chair assumed too much responsibility "o Limited delegation or sharing of IDS workload "o Lack of involvement of other community stakeholders "* Limited CAIB and senior leadership involvement and oversight "o Limited accountability to the CAIB "o Limited CAIB involvement and commitment to IDS plan "* Difficulties and/or delays in obtaining funding for activities o Lack of knowledge and sophistication by IDS on budget and resource issues o Limited CAIB involvement and commitment to IDS plan
Current Status
These bases have demonstrated significant progress since the summer-04 consultation visits. Shaw AFB has added a Feeling Good prevention initiative administered universally through its Preventive Health Assessment (PHA) to go along with Triple P, which has been running since July 04. Barksdale AFB has implemented Feeling Good as a unit-based program in partnership with squadrons and is offering PREP as its second prevention initiative. Tyndall AFB has implemented Feeling Good through key community influentials including medical group members and the First Sergeants of each squadron. Tyndall is still working funding issues in order to implement Triple P. Monitoring and evaluation efforts have been designed and are being put in place for each of these programs as they are implemented. The Stony Brook NORTH STAR consultant, Col. (ret.) John Nelson, continues to work with each installation on these activities as well as on developing and implementing strategies to increase the ongoing oversight involvement of the CAIB.
Kadena AB (fourth pilot base)
In 2004, Kadena AB volunteered as a pilot NORTH STAR base in response to base leadership concerns regarding increases in problem behaviors. Modifications to the training Slep, Amy M. Smith Slep DAMD170310166 PR023026 protocol for Kadena were made based on lessons learned from experiences at the initial three pilot bases. In addition to working closely with the IDS chair to set up the training, the NORTH STAR team established a working relationship with a senior member of the Kadena CAIB in order to reinforce the link between the IDS training and the CAIB oversight. The senior leader was pre-briefed on the NORTH STAR data, vetted the training plan and served as a link between the IDS and the CAIB. The Stony Brook team scheduled a visit to Kadena. On the first day, the Vice Wing Commander, the senior member liaison, and other key members of the CAIB were pre-briefed on the NORTH STAR data, the training plan, and the expectations for the CAIB (to include potential resource requirements) as well as for the IDS. The Kadena IDS team then received three days of training and sub-committee work toward developing their own community action plan. On the last day the IDS Team briefed the CAIB on its recommendations and implementation plans developed during the training. Pacific Air Forces, sent an observer to provide MAJCOM perspective and oversight. This proved to be a nice bit of serendipity as the MAJCOM presence fostered increased dialogue between the base and the MAJCOM and further established lines of accountability, from the base CATB to the MAJCOM CAIB. SLessons Learned: modifications and additions to the NORTH STAR prevention training protocol for Kadena AB. The NORTH STAR experience at the first three bases fits the old military adage "No plan survives first contact with the enemy." The entire point of the PRMRP-funded pilot was to put NORTH STAR in the field and make any modifications necessary before launching a more extensive RCPT. We learned from the less-progress-than-desired first 9 months at the initial 3 NORTH STAR bases and made the following changes to our training strategy, one that resulted Kadena AB getting out of the blocks much faster (and more in keeping with the original NORTH STAR timeline): "* Involve senior leadership from the start. Identify and recruit a senior leader (CAIB member) to oversee and approve 'work' with the IDS chair "* Expand CAIB oversight by clearly identifying its role as the "community board" "* Build in accountability of IDS to the CAIB, base community and the parent MAJCOM "* Expand the initial training to three days so that IDS Team develops a complete, comprehensive plan "* Provide more structure and guidance within each section of training to maximize its efficiency and effectiveness "• Expand the Implementation Planning training section to ensure key tasks and milestones, POCs, and estimated completion dates are identified and with a specific roadmap to guide implementation "* Encourage IDS to appoint sub-committees for each activity to be implemented with a clearly designated POC >Current status at Kadena AB Four weeks post-training Kadena has active subcommittees working each of its three selected activities. The financial education activity has been implemented. The bibliotherapy activity Feeling Good, will be implemented in one squadron on a demonstration basis by mid-March; a community-wide subcommittee (involving base AF and tenant Army representatives, as well as Department of Defense Dependents Schools representatives) is meeting weekly and making plans to initiate a multi-tiered (almost 3 months behind schedule) and the AF maintained the survey in the field longer than originally scheduled. The project timelines have been pushed back accordingly. Thus, algorithm derivation is on target with the revised timeline. We are in the process of bootstrapping confidence intervals for the 22 algorithms (which will allow their accuracies to be determined and compared using (a) correction factors on separate algorithms vs. (b) global algorithms). This work was expected to be complete by month 21. We now expect it will be complete by month 25.
Note: The reviewers of our previous progress report expressed concern for the low response rates and the implications to the future success of the project. We will answer this concern below, first as a broader issue of research methods, and then specifically for the 2003 CA. Note that the AD response rate was 61%, quite good considering that no incentives were provided. The spouse response rate of 24% likely generated the reviewers concerns.
Global research concepts
All research contains some sources of error. The error varies in terms of its impact on generalizability. The more error in the data, the less confident one can be that the results are representative of the population. As described by Dillman (2000) , there are several sources of error in every survey:
"* "Coverage error results from every unit in the survey population not having a known, non-zero chance of being included in the sample" (Dillman, 2000, p. 196) . Example: those who PCS to or from a base being erroneously included or omitted from the sampling frame. "* "Sampling error is the result of collecting data from only a subset, rather than all, of the members of the sampling frame" (Dillman, 2000, p. 196) . This is an element of any study where 100% of the population does not participate. The sampling error is related to the sample size and is expressed in terms of confidence intervals. As mentioned below, however, the sampling error derived from equations is not an independent measure of the generalizability of the results. "* "Nonresponse error" [is the result of those] who respond to the survey being different from [those] who did in a way relevant to the study" (Dillman, 2000, p. 197 The standard rule-of-thumb is that a 70% response rate is necessary to infer generalizability'. However, such standards ignore that missing data is only a threat if it is not missing completely at random.
Recent research on nonrespondents (see Rogelberg et al., 2003) indicates that there are two forms of nonresponse: active nonresponse (i.e., refusal) and passive nonresponse (i.e., "the nonrespondents may have wanted to return the survey, but because of circumstances or happenstance, could not or did not;" Rogelberg et al., 2003 Rogelberg et al., , p. 1105 . Empirical studies have indicated that active nonresponse is not as frequent as fearedsomewhere between 9% and 16% (Rogelberg et al., 2000 (Rogelberg et al., , 2003 Sosdian & Sharp, 1980 , Youssefnia, 2000 .
Active nonrespondents As expected, Rogelberg et al., 2003 found that active nonrespondents, compared to respondents, were less satisfied with the organization and scored lower on compliance on a personality measure. "However, the fact that some dissatisfied people did respond shows that dissatisfaction alone is not sufficient for active nonresponse... Dissatisfaction with the survey sponsoring entitity is one of a number of drivers that independently and interactively led to an individual actively withholding his or her participation. It may be the case that the active nonrespondent's dissatisfaction with the [organization leadership] in conjunction with other individual differences (e.g., skepticisms about survey research, sensitivities to anonymity and privacy issues) leads the potential respondent to conclude, Why would I complete a survey, which I don't really believe in or trust, for an organizational entity that I am not pleased with?" (Rogelberg et al., 2003 (Rogelberg et al., , p. 1111 .
Passive nonrespondents Rogelberg et al.'s (2003) study indicated that respondents do not differ from passive nonrepondents on satisfaction with the organization's leadership, satisfaction with life-areas outside of the organization, or intentions to leave the organization. They wrote "We acknowledge that we are in effect accepting a null hypothesis (which is problematic). However, the satisfaction and leaving intention means for passive nonrespondents and respondents are so close that they indicate little difference" (Rogelberg et al., 2003 (Rogelberg et al., , p. 1112 . "* "Measurement error [is the result of] questions that were misunderstood or incorrectly answered" (Dillman, 2000, p. 197) . Concepts applied to the 2003 CA "* Coverage error -Depended heavily on the quality of the lists from Air Force Personnel Center. Although the quality was not systematically tested, it probably had a modest effect on the generalizability. AF estimates are that approximately 10% of emails using the global directory address conventions do not reach the member. "* Sampling error -The sample sizes at most bases were sufficiently large to have relatively small confidence intervals. "* "Nonresponse error" -Examination of the 2003 CA data presented in this report indicate that there tended to be moderate nonresponse effects when comparing rank x sex for AD members and spouses to known population parameters. However, nonresponse error is problematic only if respondents differ from nonrespondents in a way relevant to
We have conducted extensive literature reviews and can find no empirical support for this rule-ofthumb. Slep, Amy M. Smith Slep DAMD170310166 PR023026 the study. Unfortunately, such variables are not available at the population level, leaving us without data to investigate the size of the effect of nonresponse. However, recent research on nonresponse indicates that it is unlikely that nonresponse to the 2003 CA led to high levels of nonresponse error. If the AF is like other organizations, active nonresponse to the CA was probably about 10%. The remaining 90% of nonrespondents were likely passive nonrespondents, who are likely to be highly similar to respondents on most CA variables of interest 2. Thus, lower than ideal response rates, it is likely that nonresponse error did not make 2003 CA data unrepresentative of the population. * Measurement error -This has not been systematically studied in the CA, although one can surmise, given the high face validity of the study, that measurement error will be modest.
Recommendation made to the AF
The 2006 CA should still attempt for as high response rates as possible. Many excellent recommendations for maximizing response rates can be found in Dillman (2000) . Furthermore, the AF should consider assessing types of nonresponse. For example, an initial email (to AD members) or postcard (to spouses) could be sent before the actual CA, asking the respondent (a) whether s/he intended to respond and (b) a few key questions that could be compared to those found in the CA that are most central to the constructs assessed (e.g., satisfaction with the AF, satisfaction with the base community). Secretive problems are prevalent in the AF. Most members with secretive problems are not identified as such to the AF community. Many respondents are willing to report secretive problems on anonymous surveys. Furthermore, affirmative responses at these prevalence rates make the planned data analyses feasible and highlight the importance of community-based intervention. However, there are numerous reasons why respondents might not admit to secretive problems when they do in fact exist. Thus, these rates should be considered the lower estimated bounds of the true prevalences. By trying to reduce community risk/protective factors rather than drive individuals into programs, NORTH STAR has a reasonable chance of impacting even those who are not willing to report secretive problems on a survey.
